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In Hancock v. Driscoll (2005),88 the
Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) of Massachusetts upheld
the Commonwealth’s school funding system, despite
finding severe inequities and inadequacies in the
system. In a ruling against plaintiff students
from low-wealth school districts, the high court
found the Commonwealth was meeting its duty under
the education clause in the state constitution
by making significant progress in education reform
since the SJC’s earlier ruling in McDuffy v.
Secretary (1993),89 which had
declared the school finance system unconstitutional.
The SJC’s decision in Hancock rejected the
finding of a specially assigned trial court judge
that the Commonwealth was failing to provide an
adequate education to all Massachusetts children,
and the trial court’s recommendations that the
state revamp the funding formula based on a study
of the actual costs of implementing Massachusetts’ curriculum
frameworks in a manner appropriate for all children
and that a high quality preschool program for at-risk
three- and four-year-olds be included in the new
school funding formula.
The education clause in the Massachusetts Constitution
states: “Wisdom and knowledge … being necessary
for the preservation of [the people’s] rights and
liberties; and as these depend on spreading the
opportunities and advantages of education … it
shall be the duty of the legislatures and magistrates … to
cherish the interests of literature and the sciences,
and all seminaries of them … especially the … public
schools and grammar schools in the towns ….”90 In McDuffy
v. Secretary, the SJC ruled that this constitutional
language imposed “an enforceable duty” on the part
of the executive and legislative branches “to provide
education in the public schools for the children
there enrolled, whether they be rich or poor and
without regard to the fiscal capacity of the community
or district in which such children live.”91 The
SJC further found that under the existing school
financing system, plaintiffs in the case - children
in low-wealth school districts - “are not
receiving their constitutional entitlement of an
education as intended and mandated by the framers
of the Constitution.”92
The SJC in McDuffy held that all children
in Massachusetts have the right to an education
that will equip them to fulfill their responsibilities
and enjoy their rights as productive, participating
citizens in a democratic government. In defining
the standard of education to be provided by the
Commonwealth, the SJC appeared to adopt the guidelines
set forth by the Kentucky Supreme Court in Rose
v. Council for Better Educ., Inc. (1989).93 The
SJC stated, “An educated child must possess ‘at
least the seven following capabilities: (i) sufficient
oral and written communication skills to enable
students to function in a complex and rapidly changing
civilization; (ii) sufficient knowledge of economic,
social, and political systems to enable students
to make informed choices; (iii) sufficient understanding
of governmental processes to enable the student
to understand the issues that affect his or her
community, state, and nation; (iv) sufficient self-knowledge
and knowledge of his or her mental and physical
wellness; (v) sufficient grounding in the arts
to enable each student to appreciate his or her
cultural and historical heritage; (vi) sufficient
training or preparation for advanced training in
either academic or vocational fields so as to enable
each child to choose and pursue life work intelligently;
and (vii) sufficient level of academic or vocational
skills to enable public school students to compete
favorably with their counterparts in surrounding
states, in academics or in the job market.’” [quoting Rose
v. Council for Better Educ., Inc.] 94
The SJC found the Commonwealth’s system of school
finance, which depended on local tax revenue to
fund public schools, failed to provide this level
of education in low-wealth districts. It also determined
that the Commonwealth has a responsibility “to
defin[e] the specifics and the appropriate means
to provide the constitutionally required education,” and “to
take such steps as may be required in each instance
effectively to devise a plan and sources of funds
sufficient to meet the constitutional mandate.”95
The legislature responded to the McDuffy decision
by enacting the Education Reform Act of 1993 (the “ERA”),
which established a foundation budget for each
district to be phased in over a seven-year period.
The ERA also mandated the adoption of the Massachusetts
Curriculum Frameworks, which provide learning standards
for all students in all core subject areas.
In 1999, the McDuffy plaintiffs filed a
motion for further relief alleging that the Commonwealth
failed to take appropriate legislative action to
rectify the constitutional deficiencies in the
school funding system. Specifically, plaintiffs
alleged the foundation budget amounts established
in the ERA failed to provide funding sufficient
for a constitutionally adequate education, as defined
by the SJC in McDuffy. Plaintiffs
also claimed that without the resources needed
for implementation, the Massachusetts Curriculum
Frameworks, standing alone, failed to satisfy the
SJC’s requirements for a constitutionally adequate
education.
The enforcement action was remanded by the SJC
to a superior court judge for fact finding and
recommendations. The enforcement action is known
as Hancock v. Driscoll.
At trial, plaintiffs presented evidence on their claim that students in low-income
school districts were not receiving the level of education to which they were
entitled under the Massachusetts constitution because the schools they attended
lack sufficient resources to provide it. Plaintiffs also presented evidence
on the causes of the constitutional deficiencies and on proposed remedies. Plaintiffs’ evidence
centered on four focus districts that were representative of the nineteen low-wealth
districts in which plaintiffs resided.
Plaintiffs included state funding for preschool as a component of the remedial
relief requested. Dr. Steven Barnett of the National Institute for Early
Education Research testified about the research on the benefits of high quality
preschool for disadvantaged children, including evidence that such programs
can help close the early achievement gap and lead to later success in school
and beyond.96 Dr. Barnett testified about the results of an assessment
of incoming kindergarten students in the four focus districts and two wealthy
Massachusetts districts.97 The assessment showed that children in
the low-income districts start school from one year to more than two and a
half years behind children in the more affluent districts. Evidence also showed
that children in the affluent school districts are more likely to attend a
preschool program than those in the low-income focus districts. Dr. Barnett
testified that in order for preschool to make a difference and prepare children
to learn in kindergarten, it has to be high quality. He provided testimony
on the research-based components of a high quality program.98
Dr. Nancy Marshall, associate director of the Center for Research on Women
at Wellesley College, testified about two studies on the quality of preschool
programs in Massachusetts.99 These studies show, in part, that under
current funding and governance structures, the quality of district-run preschool
programs exceeds that of community childcare centers.
The specially assigned trial court judged issued her report and recommended
decision in April 2004,100 finding that plaintiffs’ school districts
were not providing all students with the level of education to which they were
entitled under the Massachusetts Constitution. To cure the constitutional deficiencies,
the trial court recommended the SJC direct the Commonwealth to: (1) determine
the actual cost of allowing all children in the focus districts the opportunity
to acquire the McDuffy capabilities, which the court equated with the
cost of implementing the Massachusetts Curriculum Frameworks for all of the
districts’ children; (2) determine the costs of bringing about meaningful improvement
in the capacity of local districts to effectively implement the necessary educational
programs; and (3) implement the funding and administrative changes that result
from these cost determinations.101
The trial court also recommended that the SJC provide guidance to the Commonwealth
on the types of program areas that either must be covered in the cost determinations,
or at least should be considered for coverage. Preschool education, along with
special education, adequate school facilities, and all seven of the curriculum
frameworks, was on the trial court’s list of “must be covered”102 programs.
Specifically, the trial court recommended that the Commonwealth determine the
cost of funding a public preschool program for all “at-risk” three- and four-year-old
children, defined by the court as children eligible for the federal free or
reduced lunch program, children with disabilities and children with limited
English proficiency. The trial court found that “the only way to give
many children in these categories a realistic opportunity to acquire the education
for which the Massachusetts Constitution provides is to offer them a quality
preschool program and thus provision for such a program must be mandated.”103 According
to the trial court, the program must be “offered free of charge at least to
those who are unable to pay.”104
In reaching its recommendation on preschool, the trial court rejected the
Commonwealth’s argument that the constitutional right to an education extends
only from kindergarten through twelfth grade. First, the court found the McDuffy ruling
imposed a duty on the Commonwealth to provide an education at the “public school
level,” while neither the ruling nor the constitution itself define or limit
that level. Instead, the trial court observed, state statute authorizes the
Massachusetts Board of Education to establish the mandatory ages for school
attendance. Moreover, each of the focus districts offers a preschool program,
each of the curriculum frameworks adopted by the board of education has a pre-kindergarten
component, and, to a limited extent, public preschool is included as part of
the foundation budget. Based on these factors, the trial court concluded “that
the Commonwealth does in fact include preschool programs as part of the education
prescribed at ‘the public school level.’”105
Second, the trial court found that “the core of the constitutional obligation
defined in McDuffy is the duty to educate ‘all’ children in order
to prepare them to be informed, participating citizens.”106 Citing
evidence demonstrating that children in the plaintiffs’ school districts start
kindergarten far behind their more advantaged peers and that high quality preschool
programs can the help close this early achievement gap and contribute to school
success, the court concluded, “if high quality preschool programs are not provided,
the Commonwealth will not be in a position to fulfill its obligation to educate
all the children ... because at least some of these children start out so far
behind, a situation exacerbated by the lack of adequate early childhood education.”107
The trial court also cited plaintiffs’ evidence on the components of a high
quality preschool program – well-educated teachers, adequate compensation for
teachers, small class size, strong supervision and high standards for learning
and teaching – and found that “[t]he quality of the early childhood education
matters.”108
The SJC rejected the finding of the trial court judge that the Commonwealth
was failing to meet its duty under the state constitution to provide an adequate
education to all Massachusetts children. The high court retreated from its
earlier ruling in McDuffy that the state constitution required an education
that allowed all children the opportunity to acquire the seven capabilities
outlined by the Kentucky Supreme Court in Rose. Instead, the SJC
in Hancock ruled that “[i]n McDuffy [citations omitted], this
court recognized that an ‘educated child’ possesses these ‘capabilities’ [citations
omitted], but did not mandate any particular program of public education.”109 Thus,
the SJC relieved the Commonwealth of the duty to provide a system of education
that provides all children with the opportunity to achieve the seven capabilities.
The SJC acknowledged the trial judge’s "thoughtful and detailed" factual
findings and "share[d] the judge’s concern that sharp disparities in the
educational opportunities, and the performance, of some Massachusetts public
school students persists."110 The SJC also recognized that
the Commonwealth itself concedes "serious inadequacies in public education
remain."111 Yet these inadequacies were not constitutionally
fatal because of the "comprehensive and systematic overhaul of State financial
aid to and oversight of public schools"112 undertaken by the
Commonwealth in response to the 1993 decision in McDuffy.
The SJC concluded that the Massachusetts Education Reform Act of 1993 "profoundly
altered"113 the Commonwealth’s role in education through standardized
statewide criteria for funding that increased the state’s mandatory assistance
to public schools, and by establishing uniform, objective performance and accountability
measures for every public school student, teacher, administrator and school
in the state. The SJC also found that delays in full implementation of educational
improvements were attributable not to "legislative or departmental inaction" but,
at least in part, to "severe revenue shortfalls" at the state level.114
One dissenting Justice questioned the Court’s failure to examine the cause
of the fiscal crisis, which, in this Justice’s opinion, stemmed at least in
part from the Commonwealth’s policy of income tax reductions implemented since
2000.115
Having determined that the Commonwealth was not in violation of the education
clause, the SJC declined to uphold the trial judge’s recommendation for a cost
study, finding that it would divert attention from educational reform and that
any study "is rife with policy choices that are properly the Legislature’s
domain.”116 The SJC singled out the trial court’s recommendation
that preschool be a “mandated” program in the cost study as an example of impermissible
judicial interference, noting that the decision as to which programs best serve
the needs of at-risk students “is a policy decision for the Legislature.”117 The
Court concluded that “[c]ourts are not well positioned to make such decisions.”118
The SJC cautioned that the Commonwealth is still open to legal challenge under
the education clause if it does not continue on a course of improvement. The
opinion noted that "‘the content of the duty to educate… will evolve together
with our society,’ and that the education clause must be interpreted ‘in accordance
with the demands of modern society or it will be in constant danger of becoming
atrophied and, in fact, may even lose its meaning.’"119
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